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Prior to the various corporate governance scandals around the world director’s 
competencies has becoming widely acknowledged as one of the important determine of 
corporate governance and firm performance. Competency can be defined as a 
specification of knowledge and skill and the application of that knowledge and skill to the 
standards of performance required in the workplace. Director’s competencies are of 
paramount importance in every established organization and play integral role in the 
existence of corporate governance. The manners of dresses, speeches, receptions as well 
as corporate image of any firm workers are greatly influenced positively through 
directors’ ability to portray the ability of competency. Where competency reign, 
discipline, respect for constituent authorities, well design and high output must be 
assured. In this situation workers feel free to execute their role with high enthusiasm 
which invariably increase day in day out the performance of the firms’ productivity. 
Although director’s competencies has been a subject of number of studies, particularly in 
developed countries. This issue has not yet fully explore in many countries. Therefore, the 
aim of this paper is to review the importance of director’s’ competencies on corporate 
governance. It is hoped that this paper provides some idea on the importance of 
director’s competencies towards the enhancement of corporate governance.  
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Corporate governance can be viewed from an agency perspective. As long ago as (Berle, 
1932) published “The Modern Corporation and Private Property in the United States”. 
The research work highlighted some of the problems that can occur when ownership of a 
corporation is separated from control of the corporation. For example, how do the 
suppliers of financing make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or 
invest it in bad projects? How do the suppliers try to ensure that the directors do not 
become too powerful, or use their power in ways that are not in the best interests of the 
corporation? Shareholder composition varies tremendously across the world. In the 
United Kingdom and the United States institutional investors have become very 
important over the last 30 years as their share ownership has increased and they have 
become more active in their ownership role. Institutional investors tend to have a 
fiduciary responsibility, the responsibility to act in the best interests of a third party 
generally the beneficial of the shares. Until recently, this responsibility tended to 
concentrate on ensuring that the investors invest in companies that not only were 
profitable but would continue to be so. This remains the case, Governments and interest 
groups have raised the question of how these profits are achieved. Why? Because 
corporate governance is fundamental to well run companies that have controls in place to 
ensure that individuals or groups connected with the company do not adversely influence 
the company and its activities and that assets or profits are not used for the benefit of a 
select group to the disadvantage of the majority. After all, corporate governance goes 
hand in hand with increased transparency and accountability, this increased transparency 
and accountability should, of itself, lead to a better flow of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and more stable financial markets.   
1.1 DIVERGENCE UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. 
Corporate Governance is that it deals with the “relationship among various participants    
in determining the direction and performance of corporations” (Monks and Minnow 
1995, p1). Corporate governance is the relationship among various participants [chief 
executive officer, management, shareholders, employees] in determining the direction 
and performance of corporations"- Monks and Minow, Corporate Governance, 1995. Lex 
Donaldson (1990:376), defined corporate governance as 'the structure whereby managers 
at the organizational apex are controlled through the board of directors, its associated 
structures, executive incentive, and other schemes of monitoring and bonding'. This view 
was reflected by his colleague, a former McKinsey consultant, in Strictly Boardroom 
(Hilmer 1993).  
The definition of corporate governance quoted above by Tricker (1994) is focused on the 
board room but extends the scope to include 'owners and others interested in the affairs of 
the company, including creditors, debt financiers, analysts, auditors and corporate 
regulators'. Such wider concerns reflect the audience for company financial reports, 
consistent with both Trickers' accounting background and the target audience for his 
publication. Monks & Minow (1995) have an interest in 'relationship investing' as 
described by Monks (1994). Their definition of corporate governance is based on 
'relationships' as quoted earlier. Monks & Minow formed a commercial mutual fund 
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which they called 'Lens' to focus on under-performing corporations. As active 
shareholders they seek to add value to companies by relating to the boards of their 
investee companies as owners.  
 
In a broader perspective corporate governance (CG) can be defines as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled (The Cadbury Code, 1992).  Since CG is a system 
CG usually deals with ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves 
of getting a return of some profits and to ensure that managers do not steal the capital they 
supply or invest in bad projects (Shleifer &  Vishny, 1986).   
 
 
The OECD Principles of corporate governance (CG) described CG as a set of relationship 
between a company’s management, its board, shareholders and other stakeholders. It 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. It should provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interests of the company, shareholders and society as a whole, and should facilitate 
effective monitoring; thereby encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently. In 
Malaysia, the High Level Finance Committee on CG defined it as ‘the process and 
structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company towards 
enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of 
realizing long-term shareholder value whilst taking into account the interests of 
stakeholders’.  
 
It has been contended that CG practices is not a standard mode (not a “one size fits all”) 
and thus cannot operates in any standard form but rather vary across nations and firms ( 
OECD 2000). This variety reflects distinct societal values, different ownership structures, 
business circumstances, and competitive conditions strength and enforceability of 
contracts. The political standing of the shareholders and debt holders, and the development 
as well as the enforcement capacity of the legal system is all crucial to effective CG 
(Gregory & Simms 1999). 
 
Generally, effective corporate governance (CG) would reflect a number of important 
features. First, it promotes the efficient use of resources both within the firm and the larger 
economy. Second, it assists firms (and economies) to attract low-cost investment capital by 
improving both domestic and international investor confidence. Under circumstances of 
good CG practices, corporate assets will be used as agreed regardless whether that 
investment is in the form of debt or equity. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that rules 
and procedures are needed to protect the providers of capital. In this respect, business firms 
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2.0 DIFFERENCE VIEW AND EXPLANATION OF COMPETENCIES? 
Competence is a term that is subject to such diverse use and interpretation that it is 
impossible to identify or impute a coherent theory or to arrive at a definition capable of 
accommodating and reconciling all the different ways that the term is used. The common 
and accepted position is that if intellectual capabilities are required to develop knowledge 
and operationalising knowledge is part of developing skills, all are prerequisites to 
developing competence, along with other social and attitudinal factors.  It could also be 
argued that people do not have competencies independent of context. Therefore 
competence is governed by the context in which it is applied, so worker and work form 
one entity through lived experience or work (Winterton 2005).  
 
Competency can be defined as a specification of knowledge and skill and the application 
of that knowledge and skill to the standards of performance required in the workplace 
(Learning and Assessment Strategies 2003 ANTA). Competencies are common sense, 
specific competencies are not critical and an ultimate competency model exists (Ledford 
1995). Competencies are seen as those universal qualities that enable individuals to 
perform their job outside their own national as well as organizational culture, no matter 
what their educational or ethnical background is, what functional area their job 
description represents or what organization they come from (Macbeth; Baruch, 2002; 
Evans et al. 1989). Competencies are defined as the cognitive (e.g. knowledge and skills), 
affective (e.g. attitudes and values), behavioral and motivational (e.g. motivation) 
characteristics and dispositions of a person which enables him or her to perform well in a 
specific situations (Ley, 2006; Boyatzis, 1982). (Kagire and Munene, 2007). Competency 
refers to a specific behavior and characteristics of a person that result in effective or 
superior performance. Boyatzis (1982) defines competency as an underlying 
characteristic of an individual that relates causally to effective or superior performance. 
Competence also refers to areas of work in which a person is competent, and competency 
refers to the dimensions of behavior lying behind the competent performance 
(Woodruffe, 1991). McLagan (1997) notes that competencies are products of analyzing 
jobs, and they link work, people and strategy for improving performance once they are 
generated. 
 
3.0 DIRECTOR’S COMPETENCIES  
Competent Direction is often about thinking rather than doing and should really 
understand the difference between being a professional, a manager, proprietor, 
shareholder and a director. Each of these roles can involve a particular perspective and 
certain responsibilities. People also need to be alert to potential conflicts of interest. To be 
effective, a director must command the respect of colleagues and be listened to. 
Development activities should focus upon shaping and demonstrating strategic alertness 
and perception, thinking, decision making, communication and inter personal skills. 
Individuals with directorial goals should make them explicit in performance reviews and 
development plans. Preparation requires an understanding of the business environment, 
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the specific company’s situation including how its directors are selected, appraised, 
remunerated and developed, how its board operates and the contribution a new director is 
predictable to make. Multifunctional and business development experience, running a 
department as a profit centre and demonstrating contribution to the bottom line can all 
improve directorial prospects. Join up inter organizational team can widen a perspective, 
while serving on a multinational job force or undertaking an overseas assignment can 
advance an international perspective.  
 
Director’s competencies are of paramount importance in every established organisation 
either in traditional, medieval or modern firms. Such competences play integral role in 
the existence of corporate governance. The manners of dresses, speeches, receptions as 
well as corporate image of any firm workers are greatly influenced positively through 
directors’ ability to portray the ability of competency. Where competency reign, 
discipline, respect for constituent authorities, well farism and high output must be 
assured. In situation like this, workers feel free to execute their role with high enthusiasm 
which invariably increase day in day out the performance of the firms’ productivity.      
 
3.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRECTOR’S COMPETENCIES ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
In a more globalized, interconnected and competitive world, the way that environmental, 
social and corporate governance issues are managed is part of companies’ overall 
management quality needed to compete successfully. Companies that perform better with 
regard to these issues can increase shareholder value by, for example, properly managing 
risks, anticipating regulatory action or accessing new markets while at the same time 
contributing to the sustainable development of the societies in which they operate. 
Moreover these issues can have a strong impact on reputation and brands, an increasingly 
important part of company value.” 
 
Company boards of directors are bodies entrusted with power to make economic 
decisions affecting the well-being of investors’ capital, employees’ security, 
communities’ economic health, and executive power and perquisites (Banks, 2004). 
Hence, boards of directors have the ultimate internal authority within a company (Renton, 
1994). 
The history of boards of directors came to the forefront of corporate life in the mid-
eighteenth-century in Britain, when the state or the crown created them to ensure business 
stability (Tricker, 1984). Prior to that time, the only way to do business was as a sole 
trader or partnership. Within this simple structure, when a business became insolvent, the 
owner and family held all liabilities (Tricker, 2003). When the concept of joint-stock 
limited companies with separate legal entities between the owner and the company 
(called ‘separation of ownership and control’) was introduced, the owner or shareholders 
were able to elect a manager of a firm (Garratt, 1997). The owners of such firms were no 
longer responsible for managing their firm’s operations on a daily basis. Rather, daily 
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operations were in the hands of the firm’s team of professional managers (Taschler, 
2004). 
The progression from control by owners to control by managers was first analysed by 
Berle and Means (1932), leading to what has become known as the ‘agency theory’ 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency theory argues that the 
separation of ownership and control in modern corporations has resulted in a potential 
conflict of interests between the owners and their managers, in which managers may seek 
to act in their self-interest rather than the interest of the shareholders. Westphal and Stern 
(2007) added that in many instances firm managers could use their knowledge and 
managerial expertise to gain advantage over the firm’s owner. Furthermore, Ezzamel and 
Watson (2005) argued that with growth in business size and complexity of operations, 
shareholders are not able to monitor their firm’s managers. Abbas (1990) suggested that 
one way to resolve this problem is to align the interests of both shareholders and 
managers. To do this, shareholders need to appoint boards of directors to represent them 
to oversee the firm (Monks & Minow, 2001). Their appointment is based on the 
assumption that each of the board members is fully accountable for their actions on 
behalf of the owner (Garratt, 1997). 
In the literature, most definitions see boards of directors as groups of individuals elected 
by shareholders of corporations to oversee companies (Abbas, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 
1994; Bainbridge, 2002, 2008; Abdullah, 2004; Kemp, 2006) and to ensure that the 
corporation is managed effectively (Young, Stedham & Beekun, 2000). Due to the 
important role of boards of directors in modern corporations, legal requirements for 
incorporation typically state that a board of directors is set up to meet specific legal 
requirements when acting on behalf of shareholders in the firm’s decision-making 
(Ezzamel & Watson, 2005; Adams & Ferriera, 2007). Board members, therefore, carry 
out various legal obligations to perform their fiduciary duties2 in the best interests of 
shareholders (Afterman, 1970; Andarajah, 2001; Sulaiman, 2001). Such duties include 
hiring and firing of the CEO and top management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2002); 
providing strategic directions (Walt & Ingley, 2001; Kemp, 2006); and assessing 
resources (Hillman, Canella & Paetzold, 2000). In these ways, the board’s success in 
discharging its duties directly influences shareholder values (Abdullah, 2004). 
In the growth of reliance on boards of directors to bring stability to large businesses from 
the 1950s to the 1970s, boards of directors were not seen as a crucial part of the corporate 
governance process, because, at that time, the board was only part of a CEO’s team 
(Banks, 2004). Earlier researchers (e.g. Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983; Monks & Minow, 
1991) claimed that earlier boards were passive, compliant and unproductive, and made 
little contribution to a firm’s strategies. Banks (2004) argued that these boards were often 
more for status than overseeing the welfare of the business. Board members also tended 
to be ‘yes men’ (Stiles & Taylor, 2001), generally providing ‘rubber stamp’ approval of 
virtually every matter requiring a decision (Banks, 2004). In this situation, CEOs played 
the dominant role in company decision-making (Hamilton, 2000). This pattern remained 
relatively unchanged until an awareness of corporate governance began to develop in the 
1970s. In the years following the above developments, boards of directors have become 
increasingly complex. Many scholars have argued that globalisation of economies and 
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rapid advances in information technology have presented potent challenges for boards 
(Conger, Lawler III & Finegold, 2001; Cadbury, 2002; Keil & Nicholson, 2003; Carter & 
Lorsch, 2004). For example, Conger et al. (2001) and Dalton and Dalton (2005) felt that 
globalisation has led to sharp increases in the numbers and types of businesses. This has 
now led to many boards facing enormous challenges in dealing with their global business 
and operating in diverse governance and cultural situations (Gevurtz, 2002). For example, 
Arewa (2005) stated that the new corporate culture was also relevant in shaping how 
boards of directors confront the challenges that a particular business environment may 
pose. Although their links to a corporation may be remote, they still have to protect the 
long-term competitiveness of their company (Alfonso, Jikich & Banez, 2005). 
In addition, rapid advances in information technology and the Internet have changed the 
business environment (O’Brien & Robertson, 2009) and the roles of boards. For example, 
the Internet has become a major business tool, which makes the timeframe for decision-
making shorter and faster (Wilson & Lombardi, 2001). As a result, Conger et al. (2001) 
urged that speed in action is critical to the effectiveness of the board. At the same time, as 
more corporations use the Internet to disseminate their financial information, the public is 
now able to gather more information about corporate performance (Xiao, Jones & Lymer, 
2002). The ease of access to Internet stock trading has thus enabled more individuals to 
become shareholders of corporations (Taschler, 2004). This has led to many corporations 
having large and diverse types of shareholders. In effect, company governance has 
become more complex than ever before. In these ways, information technology has 
changed the functions of boards, creating situations that have never been faced before. 
Banks (2004) argued that if boards are unaware of the impact of technology development, 
especially concerning the technical aspects of business, they are unable to query or 
challenge company management effectively. 
Given such unprecedented change, many scholars assert that demands and expectations 
are increasingly being placed on boards of directors, especially in assessing corporations 
dealing with massive transformations in a global economy (Hillman, Keim & Luce, 2001; 
Ingley & Walt, 2003). These impacts were discussed earlier by Garratt (1997) in his book 
The Fish Rots from the Head. He urged that in the new business environment, board roles 
extend far beyond taking care of shareholders’ interests. The board instead has to be: 
1. A driver of company business while keeping it under prudent control; 
2. Sufficiently knowledgeable about company activities; 
3. Sensitive to various pressures; and 
4. Focused on the commercial needs of the company while taking care of other 
stakeholders including employees, business partners and society. 
In consequence of this argument, Carpenter and Westphal (2001) maintained that the 
persistent challenges faced by boards of directors today are to bring meaningful 
contributions to corporate strategy and performance. Stiles and Taylor (2001) argued that 
boards today are called on to choose strategic and tactical initiatives to address emerging 
opportunities and challenges under circumstances in which the ultimate outcomes of 
decisions are largely unpredictable. To face these new challenges, boards will need to 
include individuals with requisite skills of a world-class standard (Coulson-Thomas, 
2008). For example, in an earlier study Moran and Riesenberger (1994) suggested that in 
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global economics, leaders should have a global mindset and diverse backgrounds. These 
include: having a long-term orientation; facilitating organizational change; creating 
learning systems, motivating employees to excellence; negotiating conflicts; managing 
skillfully the foreign employment cycle; leading and participating effectively in 
multicultural teams, understanding their own values and assumptions, accurately 
profiling the culture of others, and demonstrating knowledge of, and respect for, other 
countries. Hence, it is becoming clear that boards of director characteristics of the past 
will no longer be adequate in today’s environment. Rather, the emerging business 
environment now demands a new set of leadership skills that require various leadership 





3.2 THE ERRAND OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
The Board of Directors is elected by the shareholders, and its primary responsibility is to 
oversee the management of the Company to ensure that the interests of the Company and 
its shareholders are served. Directors will provide guidance to management and exercise 
their business judgment in what they believe to be the best interests of the Company and 
its shareholders. Directors will perform their duties in good faith and with that degree of 
care which an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances. 
 
Directors must comply with the Code of Ethical Business Conduct and the Officer Code 
of Ethics of the Company.  
A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence 
and care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders. 
B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, the board 
should treat all shareholders fairly. 
C. The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account the interests of 
stakeholders. 
D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual 
budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation 
and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and 
divestitures. 
2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making changes 
as needed. 
3. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives and 
overseeing succession planning. 
4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the 
company and its shareholders. 
5. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process. 
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6. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board members 
and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party 
transactions. 
7. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems, 
including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in 
particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and 
compliance with the law and relevant standards. 
8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
E. The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgment on corporate affairs. 
1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members 
capable of exercising independent judgment to tasks where there is a potential for conflict 
of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial 
and non-financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board 
members and key executives, and board remuneration. 
2. When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working 
procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. 
3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities. 
F. In order to fulfill their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, 
relevant and timely information. 
 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
Director’s competencies are of overriding significance in every established organisation 
either in customary, prehistoric or modern firms. Such competences play fundamental 
role in the existence of corporate governance. The conducts of dresses, speeches, 
response as well as corporate image of any firm workers are greatly influenced positively 
through directors’ ability to portray the ability of competency. Since the board of 
directors are the agent of the shareholders have been identified as the key corporate 
governance control mechanism, though an internal one, it is only appropriate that board 
effectiveness should be an area where more research on its roles, functions and 
organisation should be further to be effective, they need capable directors (both executive 
and non-executive directors including those that are truly independent), with good 
leadership and high ethical standards. 
However, where competency reign, discipline, respect for constituent authorities, well 
devise and high output must be assured. In situation like this, workers feel free to execute 
their role with high enthusiasm which invariably increase day in day out the performance 
of the firms’ productivity.      
  
68 
3rd INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH ( 3rd ICBER 2012 ) PROCEEDING 
 
12 - 13 MARCH 2012. GOLDEN FLOWER HOTEL, BANDUNG, INDONESIA  




Abbass, F. A. (1990). Effective boards of directors: An overview. Industrial Management & Data 
Systems, 90(4), 18-26. 
 
Abdullah, S.N. (2004). Board composition, CEO duality and performance among Malaysian 
listed companies. Corporate Governance International Journal of Business in Society, 4, 
47-61 
 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards. The Journal of Finance, 62(1), 
217-250. 
 
Afterman, A. B. (1970). Company director and controllers: Their duties to the company and the 
shareholders. Melbourne: The Law Book Company Limited. 
 
Alfonso, F. B., Jikich, B. A., & Banez, R. G. (2005). Reforming corporate governance in the 
Philippines by engaging the private sector. In H. K. Leong (Ed.), Reforming Corporate 
Governance in Southeast Asia (pp. 299-313). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. 
 
Andarajah, K. (2001). Corporate Governance: A practical approach. Singapore: Butterworth 
Asia. 
 
Arewa, O. B. (2005). Comment: corporate governance events: Legal rules, business environment 
and corporate culture. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 55(3), 545-550. 
 
Bainbridge, S. M.(2002). Why a board? Group decision-making in corporate Governance. SSRN 
eLibrary . Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/paper=266683. 
 
______.(2008). The new corporate governance in theory and practice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press Inc. 
 
Banks, E. (2004). Corporate governance: Financial responsibility, control and ethics. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Berle, A. A. & Means, G. C. 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, 
New York. 
 
Berle, A. A. J., & Means, G. C. (1932). The modern corporation and private property. New 
York: MacMillan. 
Boyatzis, R.E. (1982). The competent manager: A model for effective performance. New York: 
Wiley. 
Cadbury Code. 1992. Report of the Committee on Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance. 
London: Gee Publishing. 
69 
3rd INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH ( 3rd ICBER 2012 ) PROCEEDING 
 
12 - 13 MARCH 2012. GOLDEN FLOWER HOTEL, BANDUNG, INDONESIA  
ISBN: 978-967-5705-05-2. WEBSITE: www.internationalconference.com.my 
 
 
______. (2002). Corporate governance and chairmanship: A personal View. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. (2001). The strategic context of external network ties: 
Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic 
decision making. SSRN eLibrary. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/paper=176428. 
 
Carter, C. B., & Lorsch, J. W. (2004). Back to the drawing board: Designing corporate boards for 
a complex world. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Conger, J. A., & Lawler, E. (2001). Building a high-performing board: How to choose the right 
members. Business Strategy Review, 12(3), 11-19. 
 
Conger, J. A., Lawler III, E. E., & Finegold, D. L. (2001). Corporate boards: Strategies for 
adding value at the top. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Coulson-Thomas, C.(2008). Developing directors, key questions for the training and 
development community. Industrial and Commercial Training, 40(7), 364-373. 
 
Dalton, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (2005). Boards of directors: Utilizing empirical evidence in 
developing practical prescriptions. British Journal of Management, 16, 91-97. 
Donaldson, L. 1990, 'The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and Management Theory', 
Academy of Management Review, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 369–81. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis..(1994). Board and company performance: Research challenges the 
conventional wisdom. In B. Tricker & A. Dartmonth (Eds.), Corporate Governance: 
History of Management. London: Prentice Hall. 
 
Dr. Wan Fauziah Wan Yosouf (2010). Characteristics of Boards of Directors and Board 
Effectiveness: A Study of Malaysian Public Listed Companies, A thesis for Governance 
Research Programme, Victoria University Australia. 
 
Ezzamel, M. (2005). Boards of directors and the role of non-executive directors in the 
governance of corporations. In K. Keasy, S. Thompson & M. Wright (Eds.), Corporate 
governance: Accountability, enterprise and international comparisons (pp. 97-115). West 
Sussex, England: John Wiley & Son Ltd. 
 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). The separation of ownership and control. Journal ofLaw and 
Economics , 26, 301-325. 
Garratt, B. (1997). The fish rots from the head: the crisis in our boardrooms: Developing the 
crucial skills of the competent directors. London: Harper Collins Business. 
Gevurtz, F. A. (2002). The historical and political origins of the corporate board of directors. 
SSRN eLibrary . Retrieved from http//ssrn.com. 
70 
3rd INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH ( 3rd ICBER 2012 ) PROCEEDING 
 
12 - 13 MARCH 2012. GOLDEN FLOWER HOTEL, BANDUNG, INDONESIA  
ISBN: 978-967-5705-05-2. WEBSITE: www.internationalconference.com.my 
 
 
Gregory, H.J. & Simms, M.E. 1999. Corporate Governance: What It Is and Why It Matters The 
9th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) papers, Durban, South Africa 9-15 
October. 
Hamilton, R. D. (2000). Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but in 
certain benefits. Journal of Corporate Law, 25(2), 349-374. 
 
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2002). The effect of board compositions and direct 
incentive on firm performance. Financial Management, 20(4), 101-112. 
Hillman, A. J., Canella, A. A., & Paetzold, R. L. (2000). The resource dependency role of 
corporate governance directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to 
environmental change. Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 0022-2380. 
 
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., & Luce, R. A. (2001). Board composition and stakeholder 
performance: Do stakeholder directors make a difference? Business and Society, 40(3), 
295-313. 
 
Ingley, C. B., & Walt, N. V. (2003). Board configuration: Building better boards. Corporate 
Governance, 3(4). 
Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and 
Owership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3:305-360. 
Kagire, J.R.K. & Munene, J.C. (2007). Engineering lecturers’ competencies and organizational 
citizenship behavior (OCB) at Kyambogo University. Journal of European Industrial 
Training, 31(9), 706-726. 
 
Kemp, S. (2006). In the driver's seat or rubber stamp? : The role of the board in providing 
strategic guidance in Australian Boardrooms. Journal of Management Decision, 44(1), 
56-73. 
 
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board composition and corporate performance: How the 
Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11(3),189-205. 
 
Ledford, G.E. Jr. "Designing Nimble Reward Systems." Compensation & Benefits Review: 
July/August 1995, 46-54. 
 
Mace, M. L. G. (1971). Directors: Myth and reality. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
McBeath, G. (1990), Practical Management Development. Strategies for Management 
Resourcing and Development in the 1990s, Basil Blackwell, Oxford,  
 




3rd INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH ( 3rd ICBER 2012 ) PROCEEDING 
 
12 - 13 MARCH 2012. GOLDEN FLOWER HOTEL, BANDUNG, INDONESIA  
ISBN: 978-967-5705-05-2. WEBSITE: www.internationalconference.com.my 
 
 
Monks, R. A., & Minow, N. (1991). Corporate Governance, 1st Edition. New York: Blackwell 
Publishing Company. 
Monks, R. And Minnow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
_____. (2001). Corporate governance, 2nd Edition. New York: Blackwell Publishing Company. 
Moran, R.T., Riesenberger, J.R. (1994).The global challenge: Building the New worldwide 
enterprise. London: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
 
O'Brien, E., & Robertson, P. (2009). Future leadership competencies: From foresight to current 
practice. Journal of European Industrial Training, 33, 371 - 380. Retrieved from http://0- 
www.emeraldinsight.com.library.vu.edu.au/10.1108/0309059091095931. 
Organisation For Economic Co-operation And Development (OECD). 2000 OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance. 13 January. 
 
Renton, N. E. (1994). Company directors: Masters or servants. North Brighton: Wright books 
Pty Ltd. 
Schleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of 
Political Economy 94: 461-488 
 
Stiles, P., & Taylor, B. (2001). Board at work. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Stiles, P., & Taylor, B. (2001). Board at work. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sulaiman, A. N. (2001). Directors' duties and corporate governance. Kuala Lumpur: Sweet and 
Maxwell Asia. 
 
Taschler, D. R. (2004). Characteristics of boards of director members and corporate commitment 
to sustainable development. ProQuest digital dissertation (AAT 3144876). Retrieved 
from http://0 proquest.umi.com.library.vu.edu.au/pqdweb 
Tricker, R.I. (1984). Corporate governance: Practices, procedures and power in British 
companies and their boards of directors. London, Glover Press. 
______. (2003). Essential director. London: The Economist. 
______.1994, International Corporate Governance, Simon & Schuster, Singapore. 
Vance, S. C. (1983). Corporate leadership : Boards, directors, and strategy New York: McGraw 
Hill. 
 
Walt, N. V. & Ingley, C.B. (2001). Evaluating board effectiveness: The changing context of 
strategic governance. Journal of Change Management, 1(4), 313-331. 
 
72 
3rd INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH ( 3rd ICBER 2012 ) PROCEEDING 
 
12 - 13 MARCH 2012. GOLDEN FLOWER HOTEL, BANDUNG, INDONESIA  
ISBN: 978-967-5705-05-2. WEBSITE: www.internationalconference.com.my 
 
 
Westphal, J. D., & Stern, I. (2007). Flattery will get you everywhere: How irrigation, boardroom 
behaviour, and demographic minority status affect additional board appointments at US 
companies. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 267-288. 
Wilson, M., & Lombardi, R. (2001). Globalization and its discontents: The arrival of triple-
bottom-line reporting. Invey Business Journal, 66(1), 69-72. 
 
Winterton, J (2005) ‘From Bologna to Copenhagen: Progress towards a European credit transfer 
system for VET’, International Journal of Training Research, 3, 2, 47-61 
 
Woodruffe, C. (1991). Competent by any other name. Personnel Management, 23(9), 30-33. 
 
Xiao, Z., Jones, J., & Lymer, A. (2002). Immediate trends in Internet reporting. The European 
Accounting Review, 11(2), 245-275. 
 
Young, G. J., Stedham, Y., & Beekun, R. I. (2000). Boards of directors and the adoption of a 
CEO performance evaluation process: Agency – and institutional - theory perspectives. 
Journal of Management Studies, 37(2), 45-56. 
